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Abstract 
 
The Spanish Flu epidemic of 1918-19 is the closest historical parallel to 
today’s Coronavirus pandemic. Its demographic aspects have been 
studied in detail, but the huge economic losses of Coronavirus have 
motivated researchers to pin down the economic costs of the Spanish 
Flu. The growing literature focuses on the US and uses city and state 
data to extract its costs with contradictory results. This paper uses 
historical statistics on GDP and industrial production to assess the 
economic costs of the Spanish Flu on the US, European, and UK 
economies. We find relatively small economic effects with the possible 
exception of the UK. Pandemics affect economic activity through human 
capital losses, voluntary changes in behavior to avoid infection, and 
state-decreed measures. The first two channels can produce economic 
effects similar to a substantial recession, but the third channel is required 
for the enormous economic losses we face today. 
  
  
Non-Biological Black Swans 
 
Pandemics are not necessarily Black Swans. Biology dictates that they 
will recur and at unpredictable intervals. Pandemics claim human lives 
and destroy health, and human capital. If unmitigated by vaccines, 
pharmaceutical therapy, or effective administrative measures, pandemics 
should have negative effects on the economy. The economic impacts of 
past pandemics have ranged from trivial to altering society as we know 
it, such as the medieval Black Death and possibly the ongoing 
Coronavirus. 
 
We are currently experiencing a non-biological Black Swan comprised 
of  the consequences of the political and administrative decisions to 
close down much of the world economy in the hopes of mitigating the 
Coronavirus pandemic.  
 
The Coronavirus Black Swan lacks close historical parallels. Postwar 
pandemics had no significant effects on a broad swath of world output, 
although particular regions and countries were hard hit. In many cases, 
local and regional interventions were imposed (called non-
pharmaceutical interventions, or NPIs) to dampen the effects and spread 
of the pandemic. However, none were accompanied by the world-wide 
economic “lockdowns” that we are now experiencing.  
 
The Coronavirus Black Swan has redrawn attention to the Spanish Flu 
pandemic of 1918-1919: Like Coronavirus, the Spanish Flu’s reach was 
worldwide. Its mortality effect, dwarfed Coronavirus, and  some of the 
anti-virus administrative measures are similar to today’s social 
distancing, business closures, quarantines, and  sheltering in place.   
 
If we are looking for a historical parallel to today’s events, the Spanish 
Flu is as close as we are going to get. 
 
Measuring the Economic Effects of the Spanish Flu Using Historical 
Statistics 
 
The most direct measure of the economic cost of a pandemic is lost 
economic activity. The most common summary measure of such costs 
would be the decline in real GDP or industrial production (relative to 
trend) that is attributable to the pandemic. 
 
In an era of relatively reliable macro statistics, we can more readily 
assess a pandemic’s effect on the economy. We already know that the 
economic costs of Coronavirus  will be unprecedented. The 2019/2020 
pandemic is the first time that we have voluntarily shut down much of 
the world economy. Thus we are operating on uncharted waters.  
 
The 1918-1919 Spanish Flu preceded modern statistical measures; so we 
have to work with imperfect and limited data to get answers.   
 
This study uses historical statistics of GDP and industrial production to 
assess the impact of the Spanish Flu on economic activity in its day. We 
examine separately the US, Europe (divided into WWI combatants and 
non-combatants), and the UK.  
 
In their survey, economists from the Bank for International Settlements 
find that post-war pandemics (SARs, MERS, Avian flu, Ebola) did not 
depress world output in a significant way, although they were costly to 
individual countries and geographic regions.  
 
The 1918-1919 Spanish Flu may be an exception, but we do not have a 
good fix on the economic losses it imposed. Three studies try to extract 
the aggregate damage from city or state cross sectional data. According 
to Robert Barro et al.’s country cross section study, the Spanish Flu cost 
minus 6 percent of  GDP in its day. Correreia et al. calculate, from 
municipal data, an 18 percent decline in U.S. manufacturing as a 
consequence of the Spanish Flu. F. R. Velde’s comprehensive study of 
the Spanish Flu using  “high frequency”  data concludes  that, contrary 
to Barro and Correia, the Spanish Flu had a negligible effect on the US 
economy.  
  
If we rely on studies based on regional variation in NPI’s, we are left 
with a wide range for the Spanish Flu’s impact on the economy from 
minus 18 percent (U.S. industrial production) to scarcely detectable. 
 
This study uses the historical statistics of the US, Europe, and the UK to 
try to isolate the effects of the Spanish Flu  on US, European, and UK 
economic activity. The data are drawn largely from Historical Statistics 
of the United States, Millennial edition, from the  Maddison Historical 
Statistics Data Base (2010 and 2018), and from individual studies. 
 
The US Historical Statistics are drawn from the millennial edition, 
which has been carefully vetted by the top authorities on US economic 
history. They are therefore not century-old relics that have rested in 
dusty storage. Unfortunately, the pre-1929 statistics have wider margins 
of error than the post 1929 figures. Interest in the causes of the Great 
Depression motivated the pioneers of national income accounting to go 
back to 1929 as a base year but not further.  
 
We are better positioned with respect to US industrial production. Given 
the widespread interest in the US business cycle, we have alternative 
indices of industrial production, even on a monthly basis. The author 
himself has recalculated the standard industrial production series by 
deflating the value series and deflators as published in Historical 
Statistics.  
 
For the European GDP data, we have Angus Maddison’s database of 
historical statistics. More on these figures below. 
 
Let’s begin with the United States.   
 
United States  
 
Figure 1 shows  the growth rates of US industrial production (two 
separate series) and GDP from 1914 to 1925 (two series) as mainly 
drawn from (and calculated from)  Historical Statistics.  
 
(Figure 1 here) 
 
For industrial production, we use William Shaw’s 1947 monograph 
which interpolates between censuses via state data and a wide variety of 
government agencies and trade associations to obtain annual data. Our 
second industrial production series is the annual average figures from 
Jeffrey Miron and Christina Romer’s 1990 index of industrial production 
compiled from 18 physical outputs.  
 
It was not until the 1930s that the first authoritative GDP series were 
created to track the course of the Great Depression. Hence, GDP series 
for earlier periods, such as 1918, had to be reconstructed retroactively, 
by the pioneers of national accounting, such as Simon Kuznets and 
David Kendrick. We use both the so-called Standard Series and the 
Kuznets-Gallman series, both  cited in Historical Statistics of the United 
States. 
 
The conclusions to be drawn from Figure 1 are:  
 
According to the best available historical statistics, the 1918-1919 
Spanish Flu did not have a noticeable effect on industrial production and 
GDP in the US. None of the four series suggests a detectable effect of 
the Spanish Flu on economic activity-- not that there weren’t significant 
downturns during this period of history, such as in 1914 and 1921. 
  
America’s entry into World War 1 could confound the above finding of 
an insignificant economic effect of the Spanish  flu. In 1917, 719,000 
men were in the armed forces. Within a year, that figure rose to almost 
three million. During the call up, the unemployment rate fell from an 
average of five percent to  1.4 percent in 1918 and 1919. Another 
complicating factor is that the US economy was gearing up military 
production during this period – a form of possible  stimulus of the 
economy. 
 
To sum up, the historical data suggest that, despite its horrendous human 
capital costs, the Spanish Flu did not affect US economic activity in a 
significant way. 
 
Europe 
 
The US cannot tell the whole story. The Spanish Flu was a worldwide 
phenomenon that blanketed Asia, Africa, the Middle East, Europe, and 
the Americas. Some contemporaries referred to it as the European Flu.  
 
Thanks to the pathbreaking contributions to historical statistics by Angus 
Maddison of the Groningen Growth and Development Centre, we have  
annual time series  at our disposal for the growth of GDP, population, 
and per capita GDP for  more than a hundred countries  extending back 
into the early 20th century or beyond.  
 
The Maddison GDP data are far from perfect. They require 
interpolations between benchmarks to get annual data, and they are all 
expressed in difficult to understand constant international dollars. They 
are the best we have and constitute a lifetime of work by Maddison and 
his team. 
  
Maddison’s annual figures on economic growth before, during and after 
the Spanish flu are also confounded by World War 1 which began in 
August of 1914 and ended November 1918.  
 
On the plus side, the European data for the period of the Spanish Flu 
offer something of a natural experiment that allows us to  abstract from 
the effects of World War I: The majority of the European nations were 
noncombatants. By focusing on non-combatant nations, we can get a 
cleaner look at the Spanish flu’s  impact on economic growth in the 
crucial 1918-1919 years. 
  
Figure 2 shows the growth of GDP in European non-combatant nations 
for the period 1914 to 1925. It shows that, indeed, there was a prominent  
decline in GDP for non-combatant countries in 1918, averaging some 
seven percent. (Note that pre-Flu 1917 was an equally bad year relative 
to 1916).  
 
(Figure 2 here) 
 
The losses of output in non-Spanish-Flu years of 1917 and 1921 were 
equally large; so the Spanish Flu was just one of many economic 
setbacks for Europe during this period. Much longer time series from 
Maddison cement the conclusion that 1918-19 does not especially stand 
out as Coronavirus is today. There were a number of output declines of 
this magnitude (5 to 9 percent) in the period leading up to World War 1. 
 
Figure 3 performs the same exercise for combatant European nations. 
The figures reflect more the course of the war on the economy than any 
effects of the Spanish Flu. The combatants suffered substantial output 
losses in the first two years of war. Belgium and France  suffered huge 
output losses  in 1917 and 1918. Germany and Austria suffered the same 
fate in 1919.  
 
(Figure 3 here) 
 
Figure 3 supports the conclusion that the war dictated the pace of 
economic output among combatant countries, not the Spanish Flu. 
Further study is required to correlate battlefield fortunes with GDP 
losses and gains. 
 
United Kingdom 
 
The United Kingdom was a combatant in World War 1  but did not serve 
as a battlefield. The Spanish Flu appears to have peaked in the UK after 
the November 1918 armistice, as troops returned home in cramped rail 
cars and transport ships.  
 
Figure 4 shows 1918 to be a year  of modest (1.9 percent) or zero GDP 
growth. As the Spanish Flu made its way into the UK in 1919, the 
economy went into decline, falling 12 percent according to Maddison 
and 7 percent according to the Bank of England figures.  
 
The years following the Spanish Flu were difficult ones, with substantial 
declines in 1920 and 1921. UK growth did not resume until 1922. 
 
(Figure 4 here) 
 
The UK is a possible exception to the relatively low and transitory 
economic effects of the Spanish Flu. The flu arrived in full force in 
1919, and growth did not resume until 1922. In this regard, the UK 
seems to have been an outlier in terms of economic damage from the 
Spanish Flu. The UK  suffered economic declines that were of greater 
amplitude than in the non-combatant countries and the US. 
 
We must be cautious in attributing the UK’s “interwar slump” to the 
Spanish Flu. There is a massive literature on the multiple causes of the 
UK’s “interwar slump.” Major surveys of this literature do not mention 
the Spanish Flu as a cause of Britain’s relative economic decline. If the 
interwar slump were Spanish Flu induced, I believe the literature would 
reflect that fact. 
 
There is no dearth of accounts of administrative anti-virus measures 
during the UK’s bout with Spanish Flu. Work hours were staggered, 
pubs were closed early, theaters were aired between performances, and 
schools were closed. Yes, there were NPI’s in Spanish-Flu UK, but we 
have little idea of their magnitude and endurance. 
 
So far, there have been no attempts to combine these administrative 
measures into comprehensive indices that could be deployed for 
analytical work. In terms of demographic losses, the UK is like the other 
countries examined. Flu deaths equaled about one percent of the labor 
force, which suggests (See below) that voluntary and involuntary 
measures must have played the decisive role. 
 
We must be careful, however, in drawing too strong conclusions. Much 
has been written on the UK’s “interwar slump” as caused by a premature 
return to the gold standard and the rise of the labor party. These policy 
events, however, were not to occur until 1925. My conclusion 
concerning the UK is that it suffered substantial economic declines that 
were of greater amplitude than in the non-combatant countries and, 
surprisingly, in the course of the UK’s Great Depression.  
 
Three Channels from pandemic to economy 
 
A pandemic can affect the economy through three channels: On the 
human capital side, pandemics reduce the labor force by excess 
mortality. The population’s physical and mental health are eroded, and 
schooling and training are sacrificed. Insofar as the stock of human 
capital is diminished, the pandemic’s effect may be stretched over a 
longer period of time. 
 
The second channel from pandemic to the economy would be through 
individual choices prompted by fear of the pandemic. People may limit 
mobility, engage in voluntary social distancing, keep their children home 
from school, flee to other jurisdictions, or decide to close their 
businesses.  These behavioral changes would have similar effects  to 
similar measures imposed by government except that they are chosen 
voluntarily. 
 
The third channel from pandemic to the economy are NPI’s, such as 
state-decreed business and school closings, binding restrictions on 
mobility, quarantines, and other ordinances that are designed to stop or 
slow down the spread of the disease through non-medical measures. 
 
The broad outlines of the economic effects of the three pandemic 
channels are no mystery. With the exception of the medieval Black 
Death, we would expect the demographic-human capital effects on the 
economy to be small for the following reasons:  
 
Even though the 1918 pandemic spread over the entire world and killed 
25 to 40 million (the most deadly infectious disease of the twentieth 
century), fatalities accounted for two percent of world population and 
around one percent of the labor force. Despite their absolute enormity, 
standard growth models suggest that the Spanish Flu’s human capital 
losses would show up as a small dip that would soon be obscured by 
other factors.1  
 
If we find large economic effects associated with a pandemic, they 
would be due to the second or third channels, or a combination of the 
two. Whereas the demographic and human capital impacts are limited in 
scope, there are few upward bounds on the other two channels. 
 
 
One of the few efforts to model the three channels of transmission from 
pandemic to economy was undertaken by World Bank analysts in 2006. 
They posited a hypothetical case of a pandemic of person-to-person 
Avian flu under “worst case” parameters of a Spanish-Flu-like event. 
Their conclusion is that the combined human-capital and voluntary-
avoidance channels would depress GDP in the high-income countries by 
3 percent. 
 
Three percent happens to be the loss of output in the advanced countries 
from the Great Recession of 2008-9. So, the World Bank exercise, if it is 
accurate, suggests that the Coronavirus impact on the industrialized 
world – with avoidance strategies voluntarily employed by the people 
 
1 As the most-deadly pandemic of the past century, the Spanish Flu cause a population loss of two percent and a 
labor force loss of one percent. Human capital costs must also be factored in along with the labor and hours loss. 
They are  more difficult to measure. In a standard Solow growth model, the effect of a one percent loss in labor 
force would therefore be less than one percent. 
but no Great Lockdown -- would have created an economic loss of the 
magnitude of the Great Recession.  
 
If we now add, the Great Lockdown (with forecasts of  a six percent loss 
of GDP for 2020 or much worse), we see that the Great Lockdown has 
doubled the effect of Coronavirus, and the underlying model applies to a 
virus of the virility of the Spanish Flu. 
 
If we find large economic effects associated with a pandemic, they 
would be due to the second or third channels, or a combination of the 
two. For the human capital channel, we would expect, at the most, a 
small negative effect on aggregate economic activity. 
 
During pandemics, the second and third channels could merge. 
Individual reactions could spill over into revolts, revolutions, civil 
disobedience and a collapse of law and order.  Government-imposed 
NPIs could shut down the economy, create poverty, and spawn civil 
unrest. Whereas the demographic and human capital impacts are limited 
in scope, the upper bounds on the other two channels are not well 
defined. 
 
To understand the interactions and correlations between the medical and 
administrative sides of the Coronavirus and the Spanish Flu, we require 
quantitative indexes of the severity or laxness of non-pharmaceutical 
interventions (NPIs) over time and space. Researchers have worked with  
regional measures for the US during Spanish Flu, which they correlate 
with regional economic activity and with a variety of results. But we still 
need much more research. 
 
In sum, for the human capital channel: we would expect, at the most , a 
small negative effect on aggregate economic activity. If we do see strong 
negative economic effects, they would be due to the second and third 
channels. 
 
Conclusions 
 The broad conclusion to be drawn from the macro data is that, despite its 
immense demographic damage, the Spanish Flu did not depress 
economic activity in the US and Europe in a significant fashion. The UK 
was a possible exception but experts on the UK’s interwar slump blame 
a number of factors other than the Spanish Flu. 
 
These results should not come as a surprise. Here is why: 
 
The administrative measures currently in place worldwide are modern 
history’s most extreme reaction to a pandemic. It is these measures, 
rather than Coronavirus itself, that are the Black Swan.  
 
Coronavirus is the first pandemic of modern history that has resulted in 
colossal economic costs. These cost come primarily through  
administrative measures, of varying degree of compulsion, which restrict 
economic activity.  
 
The Spanish Flu was many time more severe than today’s coronavirus, 
yet its economic costs were nowhere near the range of Coronavirus. 
Why is this the case? My preliminary explanation is that, although 
extraordinary measures were applied, pandemics and plagues were a 
normal part of life in 1918-19. People simply went about their business 
during plagues and fatalistically accepted the consequences.  
 
The world in 2020 views pandemics quite differently from a century 
ago. We have come to believe that science and technology can handle all 
problems. To accept the mortality consequences of an invisible enemy is 
no longer in our public choice set.  
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